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Government by Judiciary:
John Hart Ely's "Invitation"
RAOUL BERGER*

Professor John Hart Ely's Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure
and Impossibility' solves the problem of government by judiciary quite
simply: the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment issued an "open and
across-the-board invitation to import into the constitutional decision process considerations that will not be found in the amendment nor even, at
least in any obvious sense, elsewhere in the Constitution. ' 2 This but
rephrases the current view, framed to rationalize the Warren Court's
revolution, that the "general" terms of3 the amendment were left openended to leave room for such discretion.
By impossible "interpretivism" Ely refers to the belief that constitutional decisions should be derived from values "very clearly implicit in
the written Constitution"; he labels as "non-interpretivism" the view
that courts must range beyond those values to "norms that cannot be
discovered within the four corners of the document."'4 But unlike most of
his confreres, Ely insists that a constitutional decision must be rooted in
the Constitution, 5 though he does not explain how extra-constitutional
factors can be so rooted. His "invitation" theory is also at odds with his
rejection of natural law, justly considering that persons like James
Iredell-"a prominent voice for ratification"-"certainly didn't have
natural law in mind when the Constitution's various open-ended delega.*"6 In fact, the
tions to the future were inserted and approved.
Founders were committed to positive law, 7 to a "fixed" constitution.8 In
the interval before the Civil War Judges even more firmly repudiated
*A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; L.L.M. 1938,
Harvard University; L.L.D. 1975, University of Cincinnati. Member, Illinois and District
of Columbia bars.
153 IND. L.J. 399 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ely].
2Ely at 415. He also finds such an invitation in provisions antecedent to the Amendment.
Id.at 414-15.
sJustice Frankfurter, at text accompanying note 215 Infra. Alexander Bickel wrote, "It
is not true that the Framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to outlaw segregation..
. but they did not foreclose such policies and may indeed have invited them." Ely at 432
(emphasis added). Thus, speculation hardens into dogma.
'Ely at 399.
5If a "[neutral principle] ... lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as
special, it is not a consitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing it." Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973).
6Ely at 446. He more sharply dismisses natural law as "uselessly vague" in Ely,
Forework On DiscoveringFundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 29 (1978); see also id,
at 22-29.
7
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, 251-52, 390-91, 394-96 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BERGER]. Throughout I
shall cite to BERGER instead of the original source to conserve space, direct attention to
confirmatory materials, and show that these materials were spread before Ely.
8Philip Kurland, at text accompanying note 46 infra.
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natural law.9 Having rejected natural law, which Dean Pound branded as
"purely personal and arbitrary," 10 it needs to be explained why the
Framers issued a covert "invitation" to apply "untethered standards."
Ely shrinks from such untethered judicial discretion," and intends
hereafter to submit a "principled approach to enforcement of the Consitution's open-ended provisions, 1" although he recognizes that these
clauses "do not readily lend themselves to principled judicial enforcement. 1 3 And he concludes that "If a principled approach to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's open-ended provisions cannot be
developed, one that is not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to representative democracy, responsible commentators would
have to conclude, whatever the framers may have been assuming, that
the courts should stay away from them."'' 4 The Framers, however, had
even less stomach than Ely for unfettered judicial discretion; 5 of the
three branches, Hamilton assured the Ratifiers, the judiciary "is next to
nothing,' 61 not the "superlegislature" condemned by Brandeis and
Holmes. 7 Indeed, judicial trespasses on the legislative domain-policy
making-would be, according to Hamilton, impeachable;18 whereas
breaches of Ely's principles would be confinable only by judicial selfrestraint, which in the past has proved to impose no limits at all. One has
only to recall the hubbub
that greeted Herbert Wechsler's appeal for
"neutral principles"' 9 to doubt whether those of Ely will be preferable to
limits plainly discernible in the constitutional history.
By Ely's own testimony, the "non-interpretivist" theory must surmount some formidable obstacles. First, he notes, the "interpretivist"
approach "better fits our usual conceptions of what law is and the way it
works. In interpreting a statute.... a court will obviously limit itself to a
determination of the purposes and prohibitions expressed by or implicit
in its language.' 0 He considers that "the Constitution is [not] different
in this respect," in reliance on Chief Justice Marshall's assumption in
'BERGER

at 254.

"°Id.at 252.
"Text accompanying notes 27 & 29 infra.
12Ely
at 402 n.12, 448.
"Id. at 447.
"Ely at 448.

"For the "profound fear of judicial ...discretion," see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
accompanying note 96 infra.

AMERICAN REPUBLIC. 1776-1787, at 298, 304 (1969); see text
"rTHE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504. (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).

"Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 534 (1924) (dissenting opinion).
"BERGER

at 294-95.

"9Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959).
"Law professors," Ely has written, "do not agree on what results are 'good'..... Ely, supra
note 5, at 944; and, as the Wechsler debate shows, agreement on Ely's guiding "principles"
is little more likely.
2°Ely at 402. "Interpretivism," Ely opines, has another thing going for it, it retains "the
substantial virtue of fitting better our ordinary notion of how law works.., if your job is to
enforce the Constitution then it's the Constitution you should be enforcing and not
whateverelse may happen to strike you as a good idea at the time." Id. at 413.
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Marbury v. Madison that "constitutional review involves merely the
traditional judicial function of comparing one legally prescribed mandate
with another to see if they conflict... ,"2" That inference is buttressed by
the fact that the Founders, as Julius Goebel wrote, were accustomed to
"resort to the accepted rules of statutory interpretation to settle the
meaning of constitutional provisions .... ,22 also explicitly invoked in the
First Congress, which contained many Framers and Ratifiers. 2 And
Justice Story emphasized that such rules provide a "fixed standard" for
interpretation of the Constitution. 24 Indeed, Hamilton stated that "to
avoid arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to
define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them, 12 evidence that his audience distrusted judicial discretion. Certainly it would be unreasonable to maintain that courts must give effect
to the intention of the legislature but are free to disregard the cliarly
discernible choices of the sovereign people, as the Court has done with
respect to suffrage and segregation. 26 We are therefore justified in concluding that the Founders viewed the task of constitutional construction
as subject to the same limits as that of statutory interpretation.
Second, Ely justly considers that "vague and untethered standards inevitably lend themselves to the virtually irresistible temptation to intervene when one's political or moral sensibilites are sufficiently
affronted." This critisism, however, he discounts "if only because no one
is in a position to cast the first stone, ' 27 which amounts to the
remarkable proposition that scholars must shut their eyes to the truth
because they have sinned against it in the past. I for one do not labor
under that handicap, for as long ago as 1942 I refused to make my
predilections the test of constitutionality,2 a tenet from which I have
never wavered. It may be inferred that this tenet is not without its appeal to Ely, because he notes that rejections of implied restrictions inherent in "constitutional guarantees" on "the set of starting premises"
conduce to "a reliance on sources so amorphously defined and susceptible
to unassessable application as to undercut the values we usually
' 29
associate with a rule of law.
"1Ely at 402 n.11.
221 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 128 (1971).
231 ANNALS OF CONG. 507, 517 (1834)(print bearing running title History of Congress).
241 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. §399, at 383
(1833).
5
" BERGER at 308.
21 "Were a judge to announce ... that she [sic] ... intended additionally to enforce, in the
name of the statute in question, those fundamental values she believed America has stood
for, we would conclude that she was not doing her job, and might even consider a call to the
lunacy commission." Ely 402. For a similar approach to constitutional construction, see T.
COOLEY, at

note 215 infra.

2'Ely at 403.
28

Berger, Constructive Contempts: A PostMortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1942).

i 9Ely at 403.
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The "third (and most serious) general objection to the usual brand of
noninterpretivism," Ely states, is "that it is not simply untethered but
undemocratic as well," that is, "A body that is not elected or otherwise
politically responsible in any significant way is telling the people's
elected representatives that they cannot govern as they would like. 30
This notwithstanding that "throughout our history America has defined
and designed its governmental system around the core concept of
respresentative democracy"; 31 in Hamilton's words, the powers of
government are "derived ... from the great body of the people" to be "administered by persons holding their offices at pleasure, ' 32 not, that is to
say, by unaccountable judges. Ely himself observed that "[r]ule by an
aristocracy, even in modern dress, is not what Americans have ever
wanted,

' 33

even, as Judge Learned Hand stated, when clothed in the

robes of nine Platonic Guardians.3 4 As Ely notes, the "noninterpretivist
would have politically unresponsive judges select and define the values to
be placed beyond majority control, but the interpretivist takes his values
from the Constitution, which means, since the Constitution itself was
submitted for and received popular ratification, that they ultimately
come from the people." He acknowledges that this argument "stretches
back" to Hamilton and Marshall, and "seems to enjoy virtually universal
contemporary acceptance." 5 And he concludes that "An untrammeled
majority is indeed a dangerous thing, but it will require a heroic inference
to get from that realization to the conclusion that enforcement by
unelected officials of an 'unwritten constitution' is an appropriate
response in a democratic republic. 36 Thus far, I would cry, "a Daniel
come to judgment," for that is the view set forth in my Government by
Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment,

37

albeit

resting on historical proof rather than quasi-philosophical musing.
Having set the cross-bar so high, how does Ely proceed to vault it, to
draw the "heroic inference" and to undergird his conclusion that the opposing view is in fact "impossible"?
30

Ely at 404, 405.
31I. at 408.
"'Id at 409.
3Id at 411.
14L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1962).
31Ely at 412. Thomas Grey wrote that the "interpretivist" view "is one of great power
and compelling simplicity ... deeply rooted in our history and in our shared principles of
political legitimacy. It has equally deep roots in our formal constitutional law ....
Grey,
Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution,27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1975). He concedes that
the contrary view "is more difficult to justify.... Id at 708. Why, one asks, are the courts
better able to discern and articulate basic national ideals than are the peoples' politically
responsible representatives? Grey would face the confessedly difficult questions "noninterpretivism" poses by resort to "a natural rights constitutional theory"; "it was ...
widely assumed that judges would enforce as constitutional restraints the unwritten
natural rights as well," id at 716, a view rejected by Ely, and which, in my judgment runs
counter to historical fact. Text Accompanying notes 6-10 & note 7 supra.
3"Ely at 411.
37(1977).
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To begin with, he labels the "ratification" argument a "fake. The
written Constitution is not the voice of the people; it is the voice of the
framers." 3 8 Nevertheless, Ely does not consign the "voice of the framers"
to limbo, for he observes, "there are times when, in order to know what
was ratified, we need to know what was intended, ' 39 i.e adoption of the
"voice of the framers" by ratification. In point of fact, the Framers submitted the Constitution to "the people" for ratification in order that the
Constitution, in Madison's words, would be "established by the people
themselves, ' 40 by means, said Rufus King, of "a reference to the authority of the people expressly delegated to [State] Conventions." ' 4' Ely notes
that ratification was "a close thing"; 42 "[w]ithin a few weeks after the
Constitution was made public, the people were sharply aligned in two
parties for or against it. ' ' 43 Ely himself observes that "once the Constitu-

tion was ratified .. virtually everyone in American accepted it immediately as the document controlling his destiny, '44 i.e. as the authentic
"voice of the people."
To demonstrate that the Constitution does not represent the voice of
the people, Ely first invokes Noah Webster's statement that "the very
attempt to make perpetual constitutions, is the assumption of a right to
control the opinions of future generations. ' 4 But Webster was outside
the mainstream; the Founders were attached to a "fixed Constitution."
As Philip Kurland explains,
The concept of the written constitution is that it defines the
authority of government and its limits, that government is the
creature of the constitution and cannot do what it does not
authorize and must not do what it forbids. A priori such a constitution could have only a fixed and unchanging meaning, if it
was to fulfill its function. For changed conditions, the instrument itself made provision for amendment which, in accordance with the concept of a written constitution, was expected
46
to be the only form of change.

This attachment to a "fixed constitution" is well-attested. 4 7 When Ely
argues that by "making the Constitution difficult to amend" the
Framers "fatally undercut" the idea that judges are "simply applying
"Ely at 412.
"3Idat 418.
402 M. FARRAND,
also id. at 88-94.
"Id at 92.
"2Ely at 409.

RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

4'C. VAN DOREN. THE GREAT REHEARSAL 179

1787, 93 (rev. ed. 1911); see

(1948).

"4Ely at 409.
"Id. at 412-13.
"P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978).
"Samuel Adams cited with approval Vattel's "the constitution of the state ought to be
fixed." 2 S. ADAMS, WRITINGS 325 (H.A.Cushing ed. 1906). See also the letter from the
Massachusetts House to the Earl of Shelbourne, January, 1768, H.S. COMMAGER,
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 65 (7th ed. 1963); BERGER at 291.
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he overlooks that the amendment provision was

regarded as "a totally new contribution to politics," leaving in the people
"the power of altering and amending" the Constitution. 49 That provision
was ratified by the people, being advised that it would be difficult to
amend.5 0 And that very difficulty serves to protect minorities against a
tyrannical majority-specified rights are untouchable except by amendment. Would amendment sub rosa by unelected judges better represent
the will of the people? Elbridge Gerry, one of the Framers, stated in the
First Congress that "The people have directed a particular mode of
making amendments, which we are not at liberty to depart from."' The
fact that the mode is cumbersome does not empower the judges to
dispense with it and amend the Constitution themselves.
Next Ely instances Jefferson's letter to Madison, stating that " 'the
earth belongs in usufruct to the living,' that the dead have neither powers
nor rights over it." For this reason, presumably, Jefferson suggested
"that the Constitution expire naturally every 19 years. "52 But he anticipated that the people would frame a new Constitution, not that it
would be replaced by a judicial oligarchy. For he wrote, "let no more be
heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the
chains of the Constitution.' '1 3 And he emphasized that it was to be administered "according to the safe and honest meaning contemplated by
the plain understanding of the people at the time of its adoption-a
it,""
meaning to be found in the explanations of those who advocated ...
testimony that he viewed the Constitution as the "voice of the people"
and that they understood it.
Before examining Ely's "heroic inference" whereby he leaps over the
hurdles he has set up-the "invitation" upon which he bases the "impossibility of interpretivism"-it will be instructive to consider the "invitation" against the background of the historical proof that the Framers
excluded suffrage from the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment, an
issue that Ely "briskly" 55 dismisses as "Berger's repeated assertion that
given their racism the fourteenth amendment's framers could not conceivably have intended to draft a provision capable one day of supporting
the inference that blacks were entitled to vote.' ' 56 Now I did not rely on
48

Ely at 413.

49

G. WOOD. THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. 1776-1787, at 613 (1969).

5Patrick Henry argued in the Virginia Ratification Convention that "four of the
smallest states... may obstruct the most salutary.., amendments." 3 J. ELLIOT. DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADoPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

49 (1836). But the

prevailing view was expressed by James Iredell: the Constitution "can be altered with as
much regularity, and as little confusion, as by act of Assembly; not indeed, quite so easily,
which would be extremely impolitic." 4 id at 177.
"BERGER at 318. "It is not the function of the courts.., to alter the method [for change]
which the Constitution has fixed." Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221,227 (1920).
"Ely at 413.
11BERGER at 252.
1'Id at 366-67.
"I owe "briskly" and similar pejoratives to Ely. See note 103 infra.
"6Ely at 436 n.133.

GOVERNMENTBYJUDICIARY

1979]

that racism (except as background motivation but on voluminous
evidence drawn from the record that is confirmed by Ely's acknowledgment that adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment "suggests the
framers didn't think the fourteenth amendment had granted blacks the
vote. .... -. 7
Let us look at the record, if only to illuminate Ely's summary WVay with
historical facts. Justice Brennan observed that "17 or 19" Northern
States had rejected black suffrage in 1865-1868.58 Understandably,
Roscoe Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of
both Houses, which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, stated:
The northern states, most of them, do not permit negroes to
vote. Some of them repeatedly and lately pronounced against
it ....

[W]ould it not be futile to ask three-quarters of the

States to do for themselves and others, by ratifying such an
most of them have already refused
amendment, the very thing
59

to do in their own cases.

Another member of the Committee, Senator Jacob Howard, who
explained the Amendment to the Senate, said that "three-fourths of the
States ...
could not be induced to grant the right of suffrage, even in any
or
under any restriction, to the colored race. '6 0 Senator William
degree
Fessenden, Chairman of the Joint Committee, said of a suffrage proposal
that there is not "the slightest possibility that it will be adopted by the
States.... -1"The Report of the Joint Committee doubted that "the

States would consent to surrender a power they had exercised, and to
which they were attached," and therefore it was thought best to "leave
the whole question with the people of each State. '6 On this score the
legislative history is by no means "in unusual disarray. ' 63 Nathaniel
Nathanson, an adherent of "non-interpretivism," observed that Justice
Harlan (the Younger) "quite convincingly demonstrated" that the Fourteenth Amendment "would not require ... negro suffrage," and that

"Berger's independent research and analysis confirms and adds weight
to those conclusions. '64 Max Beloff, former Oxford professor and now
head of one of the "red-brick" English universities, who is 3000 miles
removed from distorting political considerations, referred to my "incon'71cL
at 90.
"I at 58-59.
0Id at 56.
61I& at 59.
"BERGER

611& at 84.

"Ely at 418. Justice Harlan declared, "The history of the Fourteenth Amendment with
respect to suffrage qualifications is remarkably free of the problems which bedevil most attempts to find a reliable guide to present decision in the pages of the past. Instead, there is
virtually unanimous agreement, clearly and repeatedly expressed, that §1 of the Amendment did not reach discriminatory voter disqualifications." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 200 (1970)(dissenting and concurring in part).
"Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEXAS L. REv. 579,581 (1978).
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trovertible" conclusion to this effect.6 5 And Gerald Gunther wrote that
"most constitutional lawyers agree" with Harlan's conclusion that Chief
Justice Warren's "one person-one vote" lacked all historical
justification. 66 Against this background, Ely's cavalier dismissal of the
issue is astonishing.
Robert Bork, former Solicitor General, summed it up in 1974,
The words are general but surely that would not permit us to
escape the framers' intent if it were clear. If the legislative
history revealed a consensus about segregation in schools 67 ...
I do not see how the Court could escape the choices revealed
though the words are general and
and substitute its own, even
68
conditions have changed.
Men do not use words, issue an "invitation", to defeat their purposes.
Then too, as Ely notes, Dred Scott (and the fugitive slave decisions) had
"spilled over into a general distrust of the institution of judicial
review, ' 69 expressed in the studied grant of §5: "The Congress shall have
power" to enforce the amendment, which led the Court to declare in 1879,
"It is not said that the judicialpower" shall enforce; "It is the power of
Congress which has been enlarged. ' 70 To read into the Amendment an
"invitation" to the "distrusted" judiciary to override the Framers' unmistakable intention to exclude suffrage verges on the "incredible." ' 71
Such an invitation also is at war with the Fifteenth Amendment whereby
the Framers signalled that there existed no other power to remedy the
deficiency. Consequently, I was led to conclude with Justice Harlan that
"When the Court disregardsthe express intent and understanding of the
Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the
amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional
structure .... "72
Such considerations receive short shrift from Ely: "what invariably
0
Beloff, Book Review, LONDON TIMES HIGHER EDUC. Supp. April 7, 1978, at II, col. 1. A
devout activist, Dean Alfange, stated, "It must be conceded that many of Berger's conclusions on specific historical points are not easily challengeable... [H]is historical argument

is very powerful." Alfange, On JudicialPolicymakingand ConstitutionalChange:Another
Look at the "OriginalIntent" Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 603,606-07 (1978).
:'Gunther, Book Review, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1977, at 4.
'Nathanson, supra note 64, at 580-81, wrote that Bickel "conclusively demonstrated"
that the fourteenth amendment "would not require school desegregation." See Wilson, at
text accompanying note 167 infra; BERGER at 117-33.
68BERGER at 214. Earlier Ely was critical of the theory that "the Constitution speaks in
the vaguest and most general terms; [that] the most its clauses can provide are 'more or
less suitable pegs on which judicial policy choices are hung.' " Ely, supra note 5, at 945.
"Ely
at 448.
70
BERGER at 221. Ely at 447, states that "it is true the (misdirected) anticipation seems to
have been that [the Amendment] would receive its most meaningful enforcement by Congress (acting under section 5) rather than by the courts." This understates the case. See
BERGER at 221-29.
"Another of Ely's pejoratives. See text accompanying note 140 infra.
"BERGER at 330.

1979]
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seems to get lost in excursions into the intent of the framers" is that "the
most important datum bearing on what is intended is the constitutional
language itself."7 3 But unlike some of his "non-interpretivist" brethren,
Ely does not altogether discard the intention of the Framers: "there are
times when, in order to know what was ratified, we need to know what
was intended. 7 4 And he acknowledges that "when the language seems
out of accord with what we are quite sure was the purpose, we owe it to
the framers and to ourselves at least to take a second look at the
language.17 If Ely has a lingering yearning to exalt text over intention,
he would jettison centuries-old canons of construction. From the bloodletting case of Bologna onward, as the Supreme Court held, "the books
are full of authorities to the effect that the intention of the lawmaking
power will prevail even against the letter of a statute." 76 Charles Sumner
stated in the midst of his vain struggle to enlarge the privileges the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment grudgingly conferred, that a
Constitution is a "transcript of [the framers'] minds. If its meaning in any
place is open to doubt, or if words are used which seem to have no fixed
signification, we cannot err of we turn to the framers .... ,,77 That such
was the contemporary view was confirmed on January 25, 1872, when a
unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee report, signed by senators who
had voted for the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments in Congress,
declared, "In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it
such interpretation as will secure the result which was intended to be
accomplished by those who framed it, and the people who adopted it. '1 8
In the absence of contrary utterances, we may conclude that those who
drafted the Amendment considered that the Framers' intention would
govern, at least if uncontradicted by the people in the ratifying conventions.
Against this Ely invokes an extensive quotation from Thomas Cooley,
the gist of which is that "the intent to be arrived at is that of the people,
and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or
"Ely at 418. And he states, "the only reliable evidence of what 'the ratifiers' thought
they were ratifying is obviously the language of what they approved." Jefferson, on the
other hand, said, the "meaning [is] to be found in the explanations of those who advocated.
. it [the Constitution]." See text accompanying note 54 supra. Ely would repudiate the
representations that the amendment did not embrace suffrage. To instance only two examples: the Joint Committee Report that so stated "was printed and distributed by the
thousands" as a campaign document. A. AvINS. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
DEBATES at vi (1967). In Ohio, Congressman Schenck denied "a concealed purpose" to confer Negro suffrage. BERGER at 115. See also text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
14Ely at 418.
7'Ely at 427-28.
7
BERGER at 162 n.23. M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1768)
states, "A thing which is within the letter of a statute is not within the statute unless it be
within the intention of the makers." Id, Statute (I)(5). See also text accompanying notes
161-62 infra.
77

7

BERGER at 372.

'AVINS, supranote 73, at 2, 571. For a similar utterance at about the same time by Judge
Thomas Cooley, see note 214 infra.

[Vol. 54:277
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abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have
accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding..
. ."9 There was no occasion to look for a "dark and abstruse meaning"
because the people had been given to understand that suffrage was excluded from the Amendment. Recall that suffrage, as Justice Brennan recounted, "was rejected by the voters in 17 or 19 popular referenda held on
the subject between 1865 and 1868. Moreover, Republicans suffered
some severe election setbacks in 1867 on account of their support of
Negro suffrage.... '80 "[N]o man can doubt...," said Senator John
Sherman, that "there was a strong and powerful prejudice... among all
classes of citizens against extending the right of suffrage to negroes."' 1
It would have been a "dark and abstruse meaning" to read the bland
terms of the Amendment as authorizing something the people so
emphatically opposed. During the election campaign of 1866, Congressman Schenck of Ohio repudiated a "concealed purpose" to confer
Negro suffrage.8 2 The Fourteenth Amendment, Philip Paludan's recent
historical study states, "was presented to the people as leaving control of
suffrage in state hands, as representing no change in previous constitutional conditions ...."813 Justice Harlan's comments on the Ratification
proceedings confirm that the people were not told that the terms of the
Amendment had a "dark and obscure meaning" which overrides this
plainly recorded distaste for suffrage and the representations that the
Amendment left suffrage untouched. 4 Harry Flack, who searched the
newspapers of the period quite thoroughly,8 concluded that "had the
people been informed of what was intended by the Amendment [the

gospel according to Ely], they would have rejected

it.

''

86

One other factor needs to be taken into account before we turn to Ely's
discussion of the three clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since he
finds an "invitation to look beyond the four corners of the document" in
provisions antecedent to the Amendment,8 7 it needs to be asked how does
"8Ely at 419.
"BERGER at 90.

"IL at 59 n.31.
81d at 115.

1ld at 155. I would not suggest that racism was the only factor. There was likewise a
deep attachment to State sovereignty which, Paludan repeatedly emphasizes, was "the
most potent institutional obstacle to the Negroes' hope for protected liberty." Id See also
id at 60-64.
"4Harlan stated, "In all the other States I have examined, were the materials are sufficiently full for the understanding of a supporter of the Amendment to appear, his
understanding has been that enfranchisement would not result." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 196-97 (1970) (concurring and dissenting in part). For similar newspaper reports
and campaign speeches, see id at 198-99. Harlan summarized: "Among the leading congressional figures who stated in campaign speeches that the Amendment did not prohibit
racial voting qualifications were Senators Howe, Lane, Sherman, Sumner, and Trumbull,
and Congressmen Bingham, Delano, Schenck and Stevens." Id at 199.
"Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,109 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
"BERGER at 153 n.82.
7

Ely at 413.
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it fit with the limited role assigned to the judiciary by the Framers. They
only contemplated that the courts would police the constitutional
boundaries to insure, for example, that the legislature would not
"overleap" its bounds. Emphatically, they did not concieve that the
judiciary would take over the making of legislative policy within those
bounds.8 Judicial review was itself an innovation, resting on the
debatable Dr.Bonham's Case89 and a few scattered post-1776 State cases
which in several instances had raised a storm, 90 so that Hamilton was
driven to assure the Ratifiers that of the three departments "the
judiciary is next to nothing." 91 On Ely's theory this nonentity is em' '92
powered by his "invitation" to act as a "superlegislature.
The "invitation" is repelled by yet other evidence. It had been
proposed to make the Justices members of a Council of Revision that
would assist the President in exercising the veto power, on the ground
that "Laws...may be dangerous.., and yet be not so unconstitutionalas
to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect." But Elbridge Gerry
objected, "It was quite foreign from the nature of ye office to make them
judges of the policy of public measures...." Nathaniel Gorham likewise
considered that judges "are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar
knowledge of the mere policy of public measures." Rufus King chimed in
that judges "ought not to be legislators," and John Dickinson cautioned
that judges "became by degrees the law-givers." Judicial participation in
legislative policy-making was therefore rejected,93 reflecting John
Adams' 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, which expressly ordained
that the judiciary should never exercise legislative power so that this
may be a "government of laws and not of men," 94 an explicit formulation
of the separation of powers. Then there is the fact noticed by Morton
Horwitz that "fear of judicial discretion had long been part of colonial
political rhetoric," notably expressed by Chief Justice Hutchinson of
Massachusetts in 1767: "the Judge should never be the Legislator:
Because then the Will of the Judge would be the Law: and this tends to a
State of Slavery." 95The last thing the Founders had in mind was to open
"For citations see BERGER at 302, 304-05, 309, 311. In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199,266 (1796), Justice James Iredell, who had made one of the most persuasive arguments
prior to the Convention for judicial review, stated, "The power of the Legislatures is
limited" by the several constitutions. "Beyond those limitations, I have no doubt, their
acts are void, because they are not warranted by the authority given. But within them, I
think, they are in all cases obligatory... because in such cases the Legislature only exercise a discretion expressly confided to them by the Constitution." (Emphasis added).
"Thorne, Dr.Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q.R. 543 (1938). Judge Learned Hand, Archibald Cox
and Leonard Levy consider the constitutional argument for judicial review inconclusive. L.
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958); BERGER at 355.

"°For discussion of these cases and their aftermath, see R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE
SUPREME COURT 36-43 (1969).

"Note 15 supra.
Note 16 supra.
"BERGER at 300-02.

"Id.at 250 n.5 & 290.
91Id. at 306-07. Quoting Montesquieu, Charles McIlwain stated, were the judiciary

joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
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the door to such discretion by use of "general words," for as Samuel
Adams wrote in 1776, "Vague and uncertain words, and more especially
Constitutions, are the very instruments of slavery. '96 Such facts are at
war with a theory that the Framers issued an "invitation" to make law
and policy. Because amorphous provisions may leave room for "interstitial" legislation 97 it does not follow that "due process" for example,
which indubitably has an historical, limited content, may be read as an
invitation to substitute judicial for legislative policy-making, as did the
Court in fashioning the now discredited doctrine of substantive economic
due process.
The Due Process Clause
Ely recognizes that the view that the due process clause incorporates
"a general mandate to review the substance of legislative and other
governmental action ... was probably wrong, "98 and that it is now
"universally acknowledged to have been constitutionally improper." 99
"There is general agreement" that the Fifth Amendment clause "had
been understood ... to ensure lawful procedures," and Ely located no
reference that gave the "identical" Fourteenth Amendment clause "more
than a procedural connotation."10 0 But he finds that the issue is not
"crystal clear" because of references to substantive due process in two
pre-Civil War cases, Wynehamer v. People (1856) and Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857).101 These, however, he correctly concluded, "were aberrations,
neither precedented nor destined to become precedents themselves."'0 2
Nevertheless he states, "it is impossible to exclude absolutely the
possibility that some [of the Framers] would have allowed that the due
process clause.., would be given an occasional substantive interpretation.' 10 3 What some of the Framers might have thought and which finds
no expression in the debates can shed no light on the meaning of the
clause. 10 4 Against this approach is the fact that (1) all references in the
control; for the judge would then be the legislator... The national judges are no more than
the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of
moderating either its force or rigour.
C. MCILWAIN THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY 322-23 (1910).
93 S. ADAMS. WRITINGS 262 (H. Cushing ed. 1904), quoted in R. MOTT,DUE PROCESS 138

n.54 (1926). This is the obverse of Adams' attachment to a "fixed" Constitution, note 47
supra.
97Southern Pacific Ry. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,221 (1916), per Holmes, J.: "A commonlaw judge could not say I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense
and shall not enforce it." (Dissenting opinion.)
"Ely at 416.
9"Id at 415.
1001d at 416; see also BERGER at 193-214.
"'Ely at 416-17.
"Id at 417.
1°'Id at 418.
"°'Ely himself states, "it should take more than two aberrational cases to convince us
that those who ratified the fourteenth amendment had some eccentric definition in mind."
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debates had a procedural connotation; 105 (2) the Framers' "distrust" of
the judiciary 0 6 was hardly conducive to a grant of power to override Con10
gress; and (3) what "some" Framers may or may not have thought

7

must yield to the rule laid down by Chief Justice Marshall: "an opinion
which is... to establish a principle never before recognized, should be ex8
10
pressed in plain and specific terms."

"So long as Lochner [v. New York] lay in disrepute," Ely observes,

"substantive due process was.., as good as dead." And he deplores "the
unfortunate resurrection" of the doctrine in Roe v. Wade, the abortion
case.10 9 But libertarians claim that "liberty" stands on higher ground
than "property";1 10 and the Court rested the Roe right of privacy "on the
concept of personal liberty." '

Ely, however, rightly rejects the distinc-

tion of "economic rights" from "human rights".112 "Life, liberty, and
property" are on a par in the due process clause, and Ely notes that they
have been "essentially read as a unit:"113 Expressing 400 years of English

Ely at 420. Yet he states "Berger's dismissal of-ihe relevance of Dred Sc'ott on the ground
it was 'universally execrated by the abolitionists, and also decried by Lincoln'. . . seems
somewhat brisk"! Ely at 418 n.77. The statements of the Chairman and members of the
Joint Committee, confirmed by its Report, at text accompanying notes 59-62 supra, are the
best evidence of legislative intention and are not diminished by what "some framers might
have thought. BERGER at 137 n.13.
10'BERGER at 201-06. James Garfield, an advocate of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
39th Congress debates, said in discussing a bill of enforcement of the Amendment in 1871,
that no State can "deprive any person of those great fundamental rights.... of life, liberty,
and property, except by due process of law; that is, by an impartial trial according to the
laws of the land." CONG. GLOBE. 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. at 152-53.
16Ely at text accompanying note 69 supra.
"'Who were the "some"? Ely himself dismisses reliance on "abolitionist rhetoric,"
noting that "the best known due process argument against slavery, that of Alvan Stewart,
was one that gave the provision a strictly procedural meaning." Ely at 417, n.76. Two of
the best known abolitionist theorists, Lysander Spooner and Joel Tiffany, "refused to rely
upon due process" or "thought of it almost entirely as a formal requirement." BERGER at
207. Charles Sumner, "the outstanding black-letter scholar of the movement ... relied
rather on the Republican form of government clause and Equality Before the Law."
BERGER at 208.
"'BERGER at 17 n.57. Not long since this view was'given striking application by-the
Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967). After adverting to the common law
immunity of judges from suits for acts performed in their official capacity, the Court held,
"We do not believe that this settled principle... was abolished by §1983, which makes
liable 'every person' who under color of law deprives another person of his civil ilghts....
The immunity of judges [is] established, and we presume that Congress would have
specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine." The even more settled pro- "
cedural meaning of due process must more clearly prevail over what "some" of the framers
might have thought due process could mean.
9
10
Ely at 422.
"'0BERGER at 268.
"'Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
"'Ely, supranote 5, at 938.
"'Ely at 421. On the distinction between social and economic rights, see BERGER at 266,
and Justice Holmes, id, at 383. Learned Hand wrote that "There is no constitutional basis
for asserting a larger measure of judicial supervision" over liberty than property. BERGER
at 267.
In his discussion of proceduraldue process, Ely notices that at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted "liberty" was used "both narrowly-(to refer only to freedom
from restraints on locomotion) and broadly (to mean freedom from virtually any sort of in-

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 54:277

and colonial history, Alexander Hamilton stated on the eve of the Convention that "The words 'due process'... can never be referred to an act
14
of the legislature," that they apply "only" to proceedings in the courts,
a statement that stands uncontradicted in the several Conventions and in
the 1866 debates. 1' It must follow that legislation respecting "liberty"
no more falls within the scope of due process than does that relating to
"property" or abortion.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause

The "privileges or immunities" clause, Ely correctly notes, "was
probably the clause from which the framers of the fourteenth amendment
expected most,""' 6 indeed, as I have shown, it was the central substantive

clause. 117 The due process clause, excluded by Ely from his "invitation"
to make substantive law, was meant to assure access to the courts for enforcement of the substantive rights and "procedural fairness," and the
equal protection clause was designed to prevent discrimination with
respect to those rights."" But the privileges or immunities clause was
aborted by the Slaughter-House Cases; and Ely justly observes that
"there is not a bit of legislative history that remotely supports the view
that the privileges or immunities clause was intended to be meaningless,"' 1 9 the effect attributed by the four dissenters to the decision. In fact there is abundant, convincing evidence that the Framers
added United States citizenship (on which the Cases turn) to that of a
State in order to insure that blacks would enjoy the rights embraced by
"privileges or immunities," that is, the "fundamental rights enumerated
hibition)." Ely at 421, n.86. For the former he notices the authority of Blackstone,
regarded as the authoritative text on common law terms by the Founders, R. BERGER. CONGRESS V.THE SUPREME COURT 30 (1969), and Charles Shattuck's 1891 study. BERGER at
270. For the latter view, Ely cites a commentator's remark that "by the mid-1860s some
Americans were accepting views of liberty . . . as something more than the absence of
restraint on an individual's physical freedom." Ely at 421, n.86. What "some" Americans
were thinking-presumably Abolitionists-affords no index of construction. In the context of due process Ely notes that "The most recent scholarship tends to downplay the influence exerted on the jurisprudence of the fourteenth amendment of such seemingly eccentric pre-War constitutional views." Ely at 430, n.122. See also BERGER at 230-45.
"14BERGERat 194. In Berger, "Law of the Land"Reconsidered,74 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1979),
I enlarge on the English and colonial history summarized by Hamilton. Ely holds that the
"Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States
their views of wise economic policy." Ely, supra note 5, at 939. By the same token they

have no right to impose their views respecting social and libertarian policy. See Ely at text
note 111 supra.
accompanying
5
" BERGER at 201-09.

" 6Ely at 424.

"'BERGERat 18-36, 169-76, 201-14. Justice Harlan correctly stated, "Since the Privileges
and Immunities clause was expected to be the primary source of substantive protection,
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses were relegated to a secondary role, as the

debates and other contemporary materials make clear." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
164 (1970) (concurring and dissenting in part).
1'Ely at 426; BERGER at 169-76, 209-14.
"'Ely at 425.
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in the Civil Rights Act.' 120 It is never too late to repudiate egregious error in construction of the Constitution, and the Court would be well advised to give effect to the Framers' intention by reversing the 5 to 4
12
Slaughter-House decision.'
Ely, however, ranges far beyond the intention of the Framers in
delineating the rights conferred by the privileges or immunities clause.
But he confesses that "it is no small problem for the suggested interpretation of the privileges or immunities clause that it would render the
equal protection clause superfluous.' ' 22 What Ely designates as "no
small problem" is in fact an insurmountable one. It is an established rule
of construction that the draftsmen "are presumed to have used no
superfluous words," that a contrary construction is to be rejected; 23 the
way to do this is to confine each clause to its proper scope.
As Ely notices, "the phrase was taken from article IV, section 2 of the
original Constitution," and that in turn was derived from article IV of the
Articles of Confederation.1 24 The object of the latter was to secure
"mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different
states," and to that end the
free inhabitants ... shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of
each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any
other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade
and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and
restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided
that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the
removal of property imported into any State .... 125
Ours is the duty of reading this language as would the Framers; for them
a general provision such as "entitled to all privileges and immunities"
was limited by the subsequent enumeration. This was stated in crystalclear terms by Madison 26 and reiterated in the 1866 debates. 2 7 Conse20

BERGER at 37-51.
'Compare Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); BERGER at 297 n.56, 352 n.6.
12'Ely at 426, 438.
' 23Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1878); Adler v. Northern Hotel Co., 175 F.
2d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 1949). In 1791, Jefferson wrote, "It is an established rule of construction where a phrase will bear either of two meanings to give it that which will allow some
meaning to other parts of the instrument, and not that which would render all the others
useless."
3 M. FARRAND. supra note 40, at 363.
4
2 Ely at 425.
"'COMMAGER, supra note 47, at 111.
"16"For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and
all others were meant to be included in the preceding general powers? Nothing is more
natural or common than first to use a general phrase, and to explain and qualify it by a
recital of particulars." THE FEDERALIST. supranote 16, at 269. Earlier that had been stated
in M. BACON, supra note 74, Statute (I)(2).
"'Thayer said, "When those civil rights which are first referred to in general terms are
subsequently enumerated, that enumeration precludes any possibility that the general
words which have been used can be extended beyond the particulars which have been
enumerated." BERGERat 28; see id. at 31 n.40; Sandtack v. Tamme, 182 F.2d 759,761 (10th
Cir. 1950).
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quently the progenitor provision was not a general "equality provision,
intended to keep state laws from treating out-of-staters worse than their
own citizens, ' 12 8 but secured equality only for "the privileges of trade and
commerce" and the like. Article IV of the Constitution borrowed the
"privileges and immunities" phraseology, and the Civil Rights Bill, as
Senator Trumbull explained, sought to make the privileges theretofore
available to out-of-staters to resident blacks. 129 Without doubt it "was intended to ensure equality among locals," 130 but only with respect to a
limited, clearly enumerated set of rights.
The article IV clause had been judicially construed in three cases,
which were repeatedly cited in the 1866 debates. In Campbell v. Morris
(1797), Judge Samuel Chase, before long appointed to the Supreme Court,
stated on behalf of the Maryland court, that the "privileges and immunities" of article IV had a "particular and limited meaning," that it
means:
the peculiar advantage of acquiring and holding real as well as
personal property, that such property shall be protected and
secured by the laws of the state, in the same manner as the
property of the citizens of the state is protected .... It secures
and protects personal rights. 131
On behalf of the Massachusetts court, Chief Justice Parker held in Abbot
v. Bayley (1827) that the article IV phrase confers a "right to sue and be
enjoy the
sued," that citizens who remove to a second State "cannot
12
right of suffrage," but "may take and hold real estate.'
Ely ignores these cases and hangs his thesis on a rambling dictum of
Justice Bushrod Washington on circuit in Corfield v. Coryell (1823). Ely
owns that this "was the opinion of a single Justice; it was dictum (the
complainant ended up losing in Corfield); and it almost certainly misread
the original intent of the clause it was construing....,,"33 Ely's expansive
reading of the dictum is exploded by the fact that Washington held that
an out-of-stater had no right to dredge for oysters in the host State!
What Ely regards as "fatal" to my reading-Washington's reference to
the right "to pursue and obtain happiness" 4-therefore did not extend
to fishing in the host State. Such are the pitfalls of dependence on dicta.
Although Washington closed by saying "we cannot accede to the proposition.., that the citizens of the several states are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of any
other particular state"31 5-he gagged on oysters--heyet swallowed suf-

"'Ely at 425.

129BERGER at 41-43.
1'IEly at 426.
"'BERGER at 33.
12I. at 34.
"33Ely at 433-34.
"4Ely at 434 n.128.
"'BERGER at

32.
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-frage: a transient could vote in a sister State, notwithstanding, as the
Supreme Court held in an analogous context, that one cannot retain
citizenship in one State and vote in another. 136 A theory which relies on so
shaky a dictum by a single Justice in disregard of actual decisions by full
courts should be suspect. But to do him justice, Ely suggests that though
"Washington may have been wrong about the clause he was interpreting,
...it would seem he was right, almost by necessity, about the clause that
would be written with an eye on his remarks.' 1

37

Nevertheless, Senator

Luke Poland, former Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Court, declared
that the "privileges and immunities" clause "secures nothing beyond
what was intended by" the original provision [art. IV, §2] in the Constitution.13 William Lawrence said, "I will concede that the courts [citing
Abbot and Corfield] have by construction limited the words-'all
privileges' to mean only 'some privileges,' "139 and these privileges, as
will appear, were enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the antecedent of the Amendment.
Before looking to the legislative history for further light, two points
call for notice. First "privileges and immunities" had become words of
art and were so preceived by the Framers.140 This Ely rejects out of hand
because commentators' readings run "off in so many directions";
"priviledges or immunities... simply wasn't a term of art." And he
brands it as "one of a family of such claims. (Incredibly,.. . he [Berger]
says, ... 'fundamental,' 'natural' rights had become words of received
meaning.... )",141 For that "incredible" statement I cited one of Ely's
favorite authorities, Alfred Kelly: natural rights
had long before [the Revolution] been given a very positive and
specific content. .

.

. The 'rights of Englishmen' were not

vacuous; instead they were quite well-developed and specific.
The notion of pulling new natural rights from the air to allow
for an indefinite expansion can hardly be considered to be
1"Id at 32 n.43.
"'Ely at 434. Certainly the sponsor of the bill, Senator Trumbull, did not view
Washington's remarks through Ely's lenses; he stated, it "will be seen that he
[Washington] enumerate the very rights belonging to a citizen of the United States which
are set forth in the first section of this bill." CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75
(1866).
"'BERGER at 38-39.
"'CONG. GLOBE. 39th

Cong. 1st Sess. 1835 (1866). After reading quotations from the
several decisions, Trumbull stated, "this being the construction as settled by judicial decisions to be put upon" the "privileges and immunities" of Article IV. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866). For citations to all three cases by both Republicans and
Democrats, see Avins, supra note 73, at 754-55.
If, as Ely reads Washington to say, he feels" 'no hesitation in confining' privileges and
immunities to everything but the kitchen sink," Ely at 433 n.128, how does that square
with Washington's exclusion of dredging for oysters? Then too, Senator Trumbull said
that Washington "goes further than the bill" under consideration by including "the elective franchise." BERGER at 33.
"°See text accompanying notes 143-48 infra.
MEly at 434 n.129.
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within the original spirit of the amendment.""
Kelly merely restated accepted learning. So, Samuel Adams wrote, "the
primary, absolute, natural Rights of Englishmen... are Personal Security, Personal Liberty and Private Property.' 148 Two "principal spokemen" and theorists of the Abolitionist movement, Lysander Spooner
and Joel Tiffany, stated that "privileges and immunities" meant that
a citizen has a right "to full and ample protection in the enjoyment
of his personal security, personal liberty, and private property... protection against oppression... against lawless violence,"' 144 goals that found
expression in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. R. M. Thayer explained to the
House that "to avoid any misapprehension" as to what the "fundamental rights of citizenship" are, "they are stated in the bill. ' 145 After
reading from the above-cited cases, Senator Lyman Trumbull, chairman
oi the Judiciary Committee and sponsor of the bill, said that the "rights
of citizens" are the "great fundamental rights set forth in this bill: the
right to acquire property, the right to go and come at pleasure, the right
to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and
dispose of property. These are the very rights that are set forth in this
bill," 46 as the text of the bill corroborates. Justice Field, upon whose dissent in Slaughter-House Ely heavily relies, 147 stated, and the record bears
him out, that Corfield v. Coryell "was cited by Senator Trumbull with the
observation that it enumerated the very rights belonging to a citizen of
These
the United States set forth in the first section of the act. .. ,,14s
historical facts, not commentator's conflicting inferences, must furnish
the basis of judgment whether "privileges and immunities" had become
words of art.
Second, the relevance of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 lies in the fact
that the framers regarded it as identical with the Fourteenth Amendment, that the latter was merely designed to "incorporate" and place the
Act beyond the power of Congress to repeal. Here Ely muddies the
waters;
The shorthand that the amendment "embodied" the Act is
used by Berger in an accordion fashion. Introduced so as to
mean that the amendment was intended to "remove doubt as
to [the Act's] constitutionality and to place it beyond the
power of a later Congress to repeal," [citation,] at other points
2

11
BERGER at 35 n.55.
43
R. MoTr, DUE PROCESS 133

& n.36 (1926), quoting Letter to Dennys de Bert from Otis,
Thomas Cushing, Samuel Adams and Thomas Gray (Boston, Dec. 20, 1765), reprintedin 1
S. ADAMS. WRITINGS 65 (1904).
144BERGER at 22.
14ld. at 28; see also Shellabarger, id.
at 170, and text accompanying note 165 infra.
ICONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866); see also James Wilson's explanation, at
text
accompanying note 167 infra.
47
1

' Ely at 425-27.

14'Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 98 (1872). This was an almost verbatim
rendering of Trumbull. Note 136 supra.
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it is invoked to suggest the idea of equivalence of coverage.
[Citation.] This sort of elision [?] is endemic to Berger's mode of
149
interpretation.
To charge me with suppression where at worst Ely can complain of confusion is utterly unwarranted; in fact it is Ely who confuses two separate
analytical strands. The framers' desire to protect the Act constituted the
motivation for the Amendment; the "equivalence" goes to an entirely different issue-the scope of the Amendment. Ely grudgingly allows that
"there were some actual statements of equivalence, but they were rare
and generally couched in terms that made clear the speaker's understandable desire to minimize the potentially radical sweep of the constitutional language. '"" Baldly stated, the speakers allegedly sought to
conceal from Congress and the people that the words had a "radical
sweep" which they did not betray! For this there is no evidence, let alone
that it would evince political chicanery. Ely's "rare" is belied by the
facts. "[O]ver and over in this debate" on the Amendment, said Charles
Fairman, "[tihe provisions of the one are treated as though they were
essentially identical with those of the other."'' An ardent advocate of
the broad "non-interpretivist" reading of the Amendment, Howard Jay
Graham, wrote that "virtually every speaker in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment-Republican and Democrat alike-said or agreed that
the Amendment was designed to embody or incorporate the Civil Rights
Act." 152 Another devotee of a broad construction, Harry Flack, observed,
"nearly all said that it was but an incorporation of the Civil Rights
Bill ... there was no controversy as to its purpose and meaning. ' 163 For
example, George Latham stated that "the 'civil rights bill' which is now a
law...covers exactly the same ground as this amendment. ' 154 There are
confirmatory remarks15 and, so far as I could find, none to the contrary.
So too, Flack's canvass of "speeches concerning the popular discussion of
the Fourteenth Amendment" led him to conclude that "the general
opinion held in the North... was that the Amendment embodied the
Civil Rights Act."' 15 6 Ely's rejection of my "claim [that] the coverage of
the two was meant to be identical"' 57 is therefore at war with the facts.
Even in the absence of proof that Act and Amendment were considered
to be "identical," what was said in the debates about the Act would be
highly relevant to the scope of the Amendment under the doctrine of pari
materia. It has long been settled that "If divers Statutes relate to the
"'Ely at 434 n.129.
1501d. (emphasis added).
"'BERGER at 22.
"Ild- at 23.

I'Id at 23 n.13.

"'Id. at 23.

"'See e.g., Stevens, at text accompanying note 179 infra; Senator Poland, at text accompanying note 138 supra.
"'BERGER at 151-52.
"'Ely at 434 n.129.
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same thing, they ought be all taken in consideration in construing any
one of them"; "all acts in pari materia, are to be taken together, as if they
were one law."'' 1 8 Particularly should this be the case where both were
enacted at the very same time and dealt with the same subject matter, so
that familiarity with the terms and meaning of the prior act may be
presumed. Where terms had been given a distinct meaning in the prior
act it requires evidence that the Framers meant to depart therefrom in
the later act.
It is no answer to insist that Act and Amendment "say very different
things."15 9 Having in the course of the debates, for example, repeatedly
spelled out what "privileges and immunities" meant, the Framers could
safely assume that the words had the same meaning in the Amendment.
As Chief Justice Marshall remarked, a Constitution cannot "partake of
the prolixity of a legal code;"'' 0 Bickel observed that "the specific and exclusive enumeration of rights in the Act" presumably was considered
"inappropriate in a constitutional provisiou."' 6' Then too, as Justice
Holmes, reflecting centuries-old learning, held, "it is not an adequate
discharge of duty for courts to say: 'We see what you are driving at, but
you have not said it.' "162 If the purpose is "manifest," said Judge
' 63
Learned Hand, it "override[s] even the explicit words used.'
What did the Civil Rights Act seek to secure, and what did the Amendment "incorporate"? Ely pays precious little attention to the crucial
terms of the Act. Originally the bill provided,
That there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities... on account of race... but the inhabitants of every
race... shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase ... real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property, and shall be subject to like punishments... and
no other. 64
Thayer (and others) assured the framers that "when those civil rights
which are first referred to in general terms are subsequently enumerated,
that enumeration precludes any possibility that general words which
have been used can be extended beyond the particulars which have been
enumerated."' 15 Notwithstanding, John Bingham, draftsman of the
Amendment, protested that the "civil rights" phrase was "oppressive,"
15'BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 76, Statute (I) (3). See also United States v. Freeman,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 556,564 (1845).
159Ely at 434 n.129.
"'0BERGER at 110 n.44.
"'Id at 39.
2
"'
Id at 369.
'63Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443,445 (2d Cir. 1959); see also note 76 supra, note
178 infra.
"6'BERGER at 24 (emphasis deleted).
'651d at 28; see also Shellabarger, at text accompanying note 204 infra.
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297

that it would "embrace every right that pertains to a citizen as such" and
strike down "every state constitution which makes a discrimination on
account of race or color in any of the civil rights of the citizen.' ' 6 In short
he was opposed to striking down all racial discriminations. At his insistence the "no discrimination in civil rights" was deleted. Ely does not
pause to explain how Bingham came by the "privileges or immunities"
clause of the Amendment to embrace precisely the view that he had
categorically rejected, and this by resort to the lesser "privileges" in
place of "civil rights."
Such an explanation is the more essential because James Wilson,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and Manager of the Bill,
had given the "civil rights and immunities" clause a very narrow construction: the words do not
mean that in all things, civil, social, political, all citizens,
without distinction of race or color shall be equal .... Nor do
they mean that all citizens shall sit on juries, or that their
children shall attend the same schools. These are not civil
rights and immunities . . . I understand civil rights to be
simply the absolute rights of individuals, such as 'The right of
liberty, and the rights
personal security, the right of personal
67
to acquire and enjoy property.1
Since this was likewise the interpretation given by Senator Trumbull, 68
Bingham's insistence on deletion of "civil rights" represents an excess of
caution, designed, as Wilson explained, to obviate a "latitudinarian"
"construction going beyond the specific rights named in the section.' 1 69
To construe his "privileges or immunities" after Ely's fashion would
therefore repudiate Bingham's rejection of an "oppressive" invasion of
State sovereignty.
For his reading that the privileges or immunities clause "was intended
to insure equality among locals," Ely relies on a general statement from
Field's dissent in Slaughter-House 9 which states that the Fourteenth
Amendment extends to every citizen the protection article IV gives to
citizens of sister States. But Field was quite explicit about the limited
scope of the clause. In reply to his own question, "What, then, are the
privileges and immunities which are secured against abridgement by
State legislation?" Field declared, "In the first section of the Civil Rights
Act Congress has given the interpretation of these terms [which]... include the right 'to make and enforce a contract .... " ',7 Mark that Field
thus confirms that the scope of "privileges or immunities" is defined by
at 119-20.
I'IIa at 27.
1"Text accompanying notes 146, 148 supra.
"'BERGER at 122.
"7°Ely at 426.
"'Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 148, at 96; see also text accompanying note 148
supra.
'6"BERGER
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the Act, as the debates amply attest. Given the framers' repeated
indentification of "privileges or immunities" with the "fundamental"
rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Bill, why is this not the situation in
which to apply Ely's acknowledgment that "when the language seems
out of accord with what we are quite sure was the purpose, we owe it to
the framers and ourselves at least to take a second look at the
'1 72
language.
How does Ely accommodate his reading-"The most plausible interpretation of the privilege or immunities clause is, as it must be, that suggested by its language-that it was a delegation to future decision
makers to define and protect certain rights that the document neither
lists, at least not exhaustively, nor even in any remotely specific way
gives directions for finding"-with the undeniable exclusion of suffrage
and segregation from the reach of the Amendment? How does he account
for the fact that attempts to prescribe any and all discriminations were
repeatedly turned back?1 73 The plain fact, as Senator Fessenden, the
highly regarded chairman of the Joint Committee acknowledged, was
that "we cannot put into the Constitution, owing to existing prejudices
' 74
and existing institutions, an entire exclusion of all class distinctions.' 1
Ely's answer, hereinafter discussed, is a variant of the "open-ended"
theory: the Framers sub rosa incorporated into the "general" terms of
the Amendment what had repeatedly been turned down.
Entitlements
Ely also finds that the privileges or immunities clause "says rather
plainly that there is a set of entitlements that all persons (or at least all
citizens) are to get and no state is to take away."'175 This he derives in part
from Field's "rhapsodiz[ing] about 'natural and inalienable rights,' "176
and in part from his reading of the "syntax" of the clause as "plainly that
of substantive entitlement. ' 1 77 Field, as we have seen, tied his analysis of
the clause to the "interpretation" given by the Civil Rights Act, and that
Act was aimed at securing blacks the same rights as whites enjoyed, to
protect against discrimination. The evidence that this is all that was contemplated is so copious that one marvels at Ely's reliance on "syntax.' ' 7 8
For example, Stevens, leader of the Radicals, stated that the Amendment
allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States

1

72
73

Text accompanying note 73 supra. (Emphasis added.)

1 BERGER
174

at 163-64.

Id at 99; see also Stevens' remarks, at text accompanying note 211 infra.
at 426.
fdMat 427.
77
1 M at 426 n.108.
'71'Thegeneral purpose," the Supreme Court held, "is a more important aid to meaning
than any rule which grammer or formal logic may lay down." United States v. Shirey, 359
U.S. 255, 260-61 (1959); see also text accompanying note 163 supra.
'M5Ely
176
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so far that the law which operates equally upon all. Whatever
law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the black
man precisely in the same way .... Your civil rights bill
secures the same thing.1"9
The bill, Shellabarger explained, "secures 'equality of protection in these
enumerated civil rights which the States may deem properto confer upon
any race.' "180 Trumbull stated that "if the State of Kentucky makes no
discrimination in civil rights between its citizens, this bill has no operation whatever in the State of Kentucky," and he reiterated that it "in no
manner interferes with the municipal regulations of any State which protects all alike in their rights of person or property."'' Such was the purpose embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, as a reconstruction
historian cited by Ely has written: "Instead of formulating positively national civil-rights minima... the Amendment forbade unequal deprivaa state
tion of the broad, uncodified mass of civil rights protections which
1 82
professed to afford equally to the generality of its citizens.'
The Bill of Rights
Ely would discredit those who reject Justice Black's theory that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights. Charles Fairman, wrote Bickel, "conclusively disproved Black's contention, at least
such is the weight of opinion among disinterested observers. ' 183 The
Court itself, as Thomas Grey observed, "clearly has declined" to accept
"the flimsy historical evidence" proferred by Black for his incorporation
theory. 84 Now Ely stamps that view, published by Fairman in 1949, as
"voguish" (although his own espousal of non-interpretivism is even more
"voguish" for that hardly goes back further than 1954) and states that
"It is not so voguish any more," citing Alfred Kelly and Howard Jay
Graham, a pair of wishful thinkers who will long be unsurpassed.18 5 Fairman's 110-page study, a model of fastidious and accurate scholarship, is
opposed by Kelly's two pages, which may be summarized in his own
terms:
79

' BERGER at 172.
1801d. at 176-77 (emphasis added); see Joint Committee Report, at text accompanying
note 62 supr; BERGER at 213; Justice Matthews, BERGER at 212; Senator Howard,
BERGER at 180.
"'BERGER at 178.
'2Id at 181 n.61.
"'Id-at 137. Dean Alfange considers "it is all but certain that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights and thus to revolutionize the administration of criminal justice in the states," and after referring to some confirmatory
evidence, concludes, it provides "ineluctable proof that incorporation was not intended."
Alfange, supranote 65, at 607.
"'BERGER at 137 n.17.
"'Ely at 428-29. For evidence, see the index to Kelly and Graham in my "Government by
Judiciary... "; see text accompanying note 260 infra.
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Black's argument is admitted partisan; it does not balance all
the evidence, and at the very least it proves too much. But the
Fairman attack also ignores or at least minimizes certain
crucial pieces of evidence, that are far more significant than he
18 6
is willing to admit.
Presumably Kelly refers to the utterances of Bingham and Howard,
which should be dismissed, not minimized. Ely labels me an "enthusiastic advocate"' 187 of the Fairman view; it was a hard-won
enthusiasm for I traversed every inch of the debates, followed in Fairman's every footstep. Did Ely do as much? It would be redundant to set
out the confirmatory evidence detailed in a chapter of my book; there the
curious reader will find ample comment on the arguments reiterated by
Ely. Let it suffice to examine some of the points he makes.
Black relied on " 'the provisions of the Amendment's first section,
separately and as a whole' " for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. 188
The equal protection clause is without relevance thereto. As to due process, the Fifth Amendment's due process clause is only one of a
numerous cluster of rights; to reason that it picked up all the other rights
is to reduce the other provisions to surplusage. When the clause was
repeated in the Fourteenth Amendment it did not change color; and the
legislative history of the Amendment shows that the Framers conceived
of due process in its traditional terms. The Bingham-Howard utterances
summoned by Black related to the "privileges or immunities" clause. 1 9
Those words seemed to Black "an eminently reasonable way of
expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights should apply to the
States," and on that score, says Ely, "Justice Black surely has a
point."1 0 The two concepts, however, are of entirely different provenance, deal with quite different matters, and, to borrow from Ely, "say
very different things."' 191 "Privileges or immunities" had its roots in article IV, § 2 of the original Constitution, which requires states to accord
privileges such as "trade and commerce" to citizens of a sister state.
Subsequently the Bill of Rights guaranteed a set of different rights, e.g.
free speech, against the federal government. And as Ely himself notes,
"if the fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities clause had
meant to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights, that would include the
fifth amendment's due process clause, and the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause would have been superfluous,' ' 191 an inadmissible interpretation, and one that vitiates Black's "eminently reasonable way"

... Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S. CT. REV. 119, 132.
18 Ely at 429 n.120.
"'BERGER at 139.
89Ely at 439 n.143, remarks on Bingham's "general state of confusion." For similar expressions by others, see BERGER at 145.
"'Ely at 431-32; see also id at 430 n.122; BERGER at 145-46.
"'Ely at 435 n.129.
"'Id at 432.
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of applying the Bill to the states.
We start, therefore, with a serious textual obstacle to the Black thesis,
not removed, according to Ely, by the legislative history. For he concludes that "although neither the ratified language nor what is known of
the intentions that generated it fairly compels the conclusion that the
provisions of the Bill of Rights were to be counted among the privileges
or immunities, there is at the same time nothing in that language or those
intentions that should preclude that result"; "the legislative history
argument is one neither side can win."' 193 If that be the case, Black's argument fails.
First, given the fact that "privileges and immunities" did not

originally comprehend the Bill of Rights, Black's proponents have the
burden of proving that there was an intention by the Fourteenth Amendment to depart from that meaning, under Chief Justice Marshall's rule
that an "opinion which is to establish a principle never before recognized
should be expressed in plain and specific terms.' 1 94 Second, the federal
government is one of limited powers; it is not enough that the exercise of
power was not "foreclosed"; the question always is: where was the power
granted. 95 In light of the Framers' continuing attachment to state

sovereignty and to the states' rights reserved by the Tenth Amendment, 19 it must be shown that the new language was designed to curtail

1"Id at 432, 430. In attempting to bolster the Howard-Bingham views, Ely is guilty of
the very practice of which he unjustifiably accuses me: interpreting in "accordion
fashion," Id at 435 n.129, more bluntly, of using a double standard. He considers that the
solitary remarks of Bingham and Howard "mount a powerful case,'? id. at 249; on the other
hand he rejects the utterances that the Civil Rights Act and the Amendment were "identical" because "they were rare," id.at 435 n.129, although the fact is, as Charles Fairman
wrote, "over and over," without contradiction, "the provisions of the one are treated as...
essentially identical with those of the other." Text accompanying notes 151-55 supra.
Why does Ely ignore the unanimity and absence of contradiction on the "identical"
issue, whereas he stresses that "no member of the Committee ...questioned [Howard's]
statements in any particular"? Ely 430 n.121. Howard was, however, implicitly
repudiated; after he spoke, Senator Poland stated, "The clause .,.. that 'no State shall...
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States' secures nothing
beyond what was intended by the original [Article IV] provision in the Constitution,"
BERGER at 148-49, which antedated the Bill of Rights. There were yet other subsequent
assurances that the clause was identical with the Act, id. at 149-53, which had no reference
to the Bill of Rights. Such remarks testify how little effect the Bingham-Howard remarks
had on the thinking of the draftsmen, who were firmly committed to limited objectives.
Then too, while Flack gathered from the contemporary prints that the people considered
the Amendment "embodied" the Civil Rights Act, see text accompanying note 156 supra,
he found no published statement that "the first eight amendments were to be made applicable to the States," BERGER at 152; to the same effect Fairman, BERGER at 148 n.66, indicating that the Bingham-Howard remarks sank without a ripple.
"'Note 108 supra.
""'When a question arises with respect to the legality of any power," Lee assured the
Virginia Ratification Convention, the question will be "Is it enumerated in the Constitution?" 3 ELLIOT. supra note 50, at 186.
"'BERGER at 60-64. The pervasive attachment to federalism, to State control of local institutions, Paludan repeatedly emphasizes, was "the most potent obstacle to the Negroes'
hope for protected liberty." Id. at 155.
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those rights, a conclusion, Ely concedes, that is not "fairly compelled" by
the text of "privileges and immunities." The legislative history clearly
blocks such curtailment.
Bearing in mind that according to Flack and Fairman the people were
not apprised that the Bill of Rights was to be made applicable to the
states, nor that, in Flack's words, "privileges granted by those amendments were to be considered as privileges secured by the [Fourteenth]
amendment, ' ' 197 what Black said on another occasion sounds the death
knell of his incorporation theory. He wrote, substituting for his "corporations" the words "Bill of Rights,"
The states did not adopt the Amendment with knowledge of
its sweeping meaning under its present construction. No section of the Amendment gave notice to the people that, if
adopted, it would subject every state law... affecting [the Bill
of Rights] ... to censorship of the United States courts. No
work in all the Amendment gave any hint that its adoption
would deprive the states of their long recognized power to
regulate [matters controlled by the Bill of Rights]. 198
The Equal Protection Clause
To Ely, the equal protection clause clearly illustrates "inescapable
open-endedness," and "awareness," borrowing from Bickel, "on the part
of the framers that it was [a] constitution they were writing, which led to
a choice of language capable of growth."' 199 One would expect after Gerald
Gunther's discovery of Marshall's disclaimer that this M'Culloch dictum
implied constitutional powers could "be enlarged by construction or
otherwise" that academicians would no longer rely on the dictum. 00 Not
one to mince words, Ely asserts "the conclusion is utterly inescapable"
that we cannot derive the content of the clause "from anything within
201
the four corners of the document or the known intent of the framers.
He ignores the evidence that the framers employed equal protection as an
adjective adjunct of the substantive privileges or immunities clause,
designed to prevent discrimination with respect to the rights earlier
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act. A few items must suffice.
In an early version of the amendment, provision was made for both
"the same political rights and privileges and.., equal protection in the

11Id at 152.
111Id at 156.
99
' Ely at 436.
20
° BERGER at 376-77. Gunther commented, "If virtually unlimited congressional [or
judicial, for Marshall also disclaimed a judicial "right to change that instrument," id at
377,] discretion is required to meet twentieth century needs, candid argument to that effect, rather than ritual invoking of Marshall's authority, would seem to me more clearly in
accord with the Chief Justice's stance." Id. at 378 n.19.
2
Ely at 438 (emphasis added).
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enjoyment of life, liberty and property," testimony that "equal protection" did not comprehend "political rights and privileges," but was confined to "life, liberty or property." When the "political rights and
privileges" was elided, leaving "equal protection" alone, 20 2 the latter
patently did not include the deleted companion "political privileges" and
a fortiori, those which had not even been mentioned. To be sure, the
"political privileges" was replaced by "privileges and immunities," but
that, as we have seen, did not include "political privileges." Throughout
the debates on the Civil Rights Bill which, it will be recalled, only secured
the "equal benefit of all laws for security of person and property," the
Framers interchangeably referred to "equality," "equality before the
law" and "equal protection," but always in the circumscribed context of
the rights enumerated in the bill. 20 3 Shellabarger's remarks are illustrative: "Whatever rights as to each of these enumerated civil (not
political) matters the State may confer upon one race... shall be held by
all races in equality... It secures ... equality of protection in those
enumerated civil rights .... "204 Bickel concluded that the Moderate
leadership (which prevailed)20 5 had in mind a "limited and well-defined
meaning... a right to equal protection in the literal sense of benefitting
equally from the laws for the security of person and property. 20 6 This is
irreconcilable with a "choice of language capable of growth." Even the
abolitionists shrank from "social equality. ' 20 7 In the debates on the fourteenth amendment, for which he voted, James Patterson of New Hampshire stated that he was opposed "to any law discriminating against
[blacks] in the security of life, liberty, person, property and the proceeds
of their labor. These civil rights all should enjoy. Beyond this I am not
prepared to go . .. ."208 There were similar utterances by others;2 9 and
there is no evidence that when the words "equal protection of the laws"
were embodied in the amendment they were freighted with a new cargo of
meaning-unlimited equality across the board. Instead the evidence is
plainly to the contrary. The earlier quoted utterance of Patterson is confirmed by the fact that attempts to bar all discrimination were repeatedly
voted down. 0 Very early the foremost Radical, Stevens, proposed that
2 2

1 BERGER at 171. James Wilson, for example, stressed that the rights enumerated in the
Civil Rights Bill were no "greater than the rights which are included in the general terms
'Life, liberty, and property.' " BERGER at 28; cf text accompanying notes 144-46 supra,
text accompanying note 208 infra.
23Id
2

4fd

169-72.
170 (emphasis added).

2"See M. L. Benedict's recent historical summation, BERGER at 237-39.
"0 6BERGER at 170 n.20.
20
'This is the view of Derrick Bell, a black academician. BERGER at 167.
208
id at 29.
209
Thomas Davis, a New York Republican, said, Negroes "must be made equal before the
law, and be permitted to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," but he was
against "the establishment of perfect equality between the colored and the white race of
the1 South." BERGER at 170 (emphasis added).
OBERGER at 163-64.
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"all national and State laws shall be equally applicable to every citizen..
. that is the one I love...." When he summed up his views on the amendment, he said he had hoped to free our institutions "from every vestige of
that no distinctionwoad be tolerated.... This
... inequality of rights ...
bright dream has vanished .... ,, 21 No amount of crystal-gazing into the

textual "equal protection" can overcomethishistory-not noticed by Ely..
In sum, the historical facts-including the unmistakable exclusion of suffrage and segregation-establish the "known intent," i.e. the limited
meaning equal protection had for the framers.
The Open-Ended Theory
To escape from the facts Ely theorizes that the Framers deliberately
chose

language

"capable

of growth,

2

12

Bickel's

"open-ended

phraseology" theory. Again a bare summary of the bulky evidence to the
contrary 2 3 must suffice. As Justice Frankfurter's clerk, Bickel's research
led him to the conclusion that "it is impossible to conclude that the 39th
Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible also to conclude that they foresaw it might be, under the language they were
adopting, ' 214 a far cry from a "choice of language capable of growth."
Wrestling with his conscience, Frankfurter asked, "What justifies us in
saying that what was equal in 1868 is not equal now," and concluded that
"the equality of laws enshrined in a constitution which was 'made for an
undefined and expanding future...' [the deflated Marshall dictum] is not
a fixed formula defined with particularity at a particular time. '215 Thus
inspired, Bickel, niow a research fellow at Harvard revising his memorandum for publication, asked, "what if any thought was given to the long
range effect of the amendment in the future?" And he ventured the tentative hypothesis: could resort to "equal protection of the laws"
have failed to leave the implication that the new phrase, while
it did not necessarily, and certainly not expressly, carry
greater coverage than the old, was nevertheless roomier, more
receptive to the "latitudinarian" construction? No one made

211

.& at 173; see Fessenden, at text accompanying note 174 supra. Stevens also stated
that the Amendment "falls far short of my wishes... [but] it is all that can be obtained in
the21 2present state of public opinion." CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
Text accompanying note 199 supra.
213
BERGER at

2lId
2

99-116.

at 100.

'"Id at 132. This is a variant of the argument that words change their meaning over the
years and that we are therefore justified in adopting the modern meaning. In criticizing
that argument I instanced Hamlet's "can tell a hawk from a hand-saw," i.e. a heron, today
meaning a toothed cutting tool, to illustrate the danger inherent in the substitution of
modern meanings for those of the draftsmen. Id at 370. From this Ely deduces that I cannot "tell ambiguity from vagueness,' Ely at 434 n.129, though neither was relevant to my
discussion of a change of meaning. Nor was my analysis at that point concerned with the
meaning of "privileges or immunities" or "equal protection."
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the point with regard to this particular clause. 216
"It remains true," he wrote, "that an explicit provision going further
than the Civil Rights Act would not have carried in the 39th Congress."
And he noted that the Republicans drew back from a "formulation
dangerously vulnerable to attacks pandering to the prejudice of the
people." But, he speculated, "may it not be that the Moderates and
Radicals reached a compromise permitting them to go to the country
with language which they could, where necessary, defend against damag-

ing alarms raised by the opposition but which at the same time was sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable future advances? 2 17 The votes of 125
to 12 in the House and 34 to 4 in the Senate against suffrage proposals
demonstrate that there was no need for such a compromise. 218 Bickel's
hypothesis, to speak plainly, is that the compromisers concealed the
future objectives they dared not avow lest the whole enterprise be im-

Regarding the change of meaning argument, it needs to be noted that Frankfurter was
at odds with the framers. In June, 1824, Madison wrote, "What a metamorphosis would be
produced in the code of law if all its ancient phraseology were to be taken in its modern
sense!" 3 Farrant, supranote 40, at 464. And on "January 25, 1872, a unanimous Judiciary
Committee Report, signed by senators who had voted for the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments in Congress, declared:
'In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it such interpretation as will secure the result which was intended to be accomplished by those
who framed it, and the people who adopted it .... A construction which should
give the phrase "a republican form of government" a meaning different from
the sense in which it was understood and employed by the people when they
adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from
the plain and expressed language of the Constitution in any other particular.... A change in the popular use of any word employed in the Constitution cannot retroact upon the Constitution, either to enlarge or limit its provisions.'
Avins, supra note 73, at 2, 571.
The Committee could invoke the authority of Thomas Cooley, cited to us by Ely, at text
accompanying note 79 supra:
"A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another
at some subsequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as
perhaps to make a different rule in the case seems desirable." A court "which
should allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in giving to a written
constitution a construction not warranted by the intention of its founders,
would be justly chargeable with reckless disregard of official oath and public
duty .... The meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is
not different at any subsequent time .... The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in
adopting it."
T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 68-69 (6th ed. 1890).
So too, Justice Holmes declared, "Of course, the purpose of written instruments is to express some intention or state of mind of those who write them, and it is desirable to make
that purpose effective." 0. W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 206 (1920) (emphasis added). It is only as Academe has struggled to rationalize the desegregation and reapportionment decisions that the "original intention" has been thrown into the discard.
6
11 BERGER at 101-02. Bickel did not take account of the elision of "the same political
rights and privileges." Text accompanying note 202 supra.
"'BERGER at 104.
1'd at 105. Senator Sherman told an Ohio audience while the amendment was up for
ratification, "we defeated every radical proposition-... "Id at 105.
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periled.
Ely retorts that "Obtaining ratification of open-ended language in the
expectation it will be given an open-ended interpretation is not playing a
trick." 1 9 That "expectation," however, was not disclosed to the ratifiers;
on the contrary, they were assured that the amendment went no further
than the Civil Rights Act. Senator Fessenden defined a trick as doing
"something... which you cannot do if you make it plain to their [the people's] senses what is the object.

220

Beckel noted that a candid "formula-

tion" would have "been dangerously vulnerable to attacks pandering to
the prejudice of the people," that is, it would have been politically
disastrous.2 2' In Ely's more subdued phraseology, "The recognition that
there was racism in society doubtless was one reason the framers chose
open-ended language capable of development over time.

' 222

Hence, he ex-

plains, the speakers sought "to minimize the potentially radical sweep of
the constitutional language. ' 222 They did not merely minimize it, they
concealed it. All this, of course, on the supposition, for which there is not
a shred of evidence, that they meant to employ two-faced terms.
Something that was not disclosed was not ratified, because ratification
requires "a full knowledge of all the material facts. If the material facts
be either suppressed or unknown" the ratification is invalid. 22 4 And as

Ely states, 25"something that was not ratified cannot be part of our Constitution.

2

As part of his critique Ely impugns my statement that "the key to an
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is that the North was shot
through with Negrophobia," paraphrasing my view that "given their
racism the fourteenth amendment's framers could not conceivably have
intended to draft a provision capable one day of supporting the interference that the blacks are entitled to vote." 22 6 And he adds an ironical
flick that "These, of course, are the self-same framers whose every conception Berger's methodology obligates him to defer to, 212 7 thereby

revealing that his respect for the framers' intent is geared to its correspondence with his predilections. Ely's statement that my views
21

Ely at 436 n.132.

220BERGER at 107. A leading Radical, Congressman Schenck of Ohio, averred the

Democrats "are afraid that [the amendment] may have some concealed purpose of
elevating Negroes ... [to] make them voters. It goes to no such length." Id
"2'SeeFlack, at text accompanying note 85 supra.
22
Ely at 436 n. 132. In another context, Henry Hart commented on the "ineffability of
the assumption that in the interpretation of documents embodying a grant of general fundamental powers from the people to their government the representations made to the people to obtain the grants are irrelevant and what alone counts are the secret thoughts of
men who drew the documents the people approved." Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV.
1456, 1481 (1954).
213Ely 434 n.129.
12'BERGER

at 155 n.93.

22'Ely at 418.
26Ely
227

td

at 436 n.133.
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"border on perversity" 228 calls for a brief summary of some pertinent
facts. The rejection of black suffrage by 17-19 states alone testifies to
racism; "three-fourths of the States," said Senator Howard, "could not
be induced to grant the right of suffrage."2 29 Senator Sherman said,
"there was a strong and powerful prejudice among all classes of citizens
against extending the right of suffrage to the negroes. 2 0 James Wilson
felt constrained to assure the framers that "civil rights" did not extend
to mixed schools and jury service.2 1 In the House, George Julian, a
leading Radical, averred, "The real trouble is we hate the Negro," 23 2 an
"almost ineradicable prejudice"2 33 acknowledged by others. Could such
admitted prejudice be without powerful influence on the drafting of the
amendment? It is Ely who "perversely" shuts his eyes to the undeniable
facts.
But, Ely argues, "Curiously lacking is any attempt whatever to account for the fact that the fifteenth amendment, explicitly granting
blacks the vote, was proposed and ratified only two years later "i.e.
1869-1870, and this "seems fatal... to Berger's general claim of the
dominance of 'Negrophobia.' "224 Yet Senator Henry Wilson, a
Massachusetts Radical, stated in January 1869, "There is not today a
square mile in the United States where the advocacy of equal rights and
privileges of those colored men has not been in the past and is not now
unpopular. ' 235 In a recent historical study Philip Paludan concluded that
racism was "as pervasive during Reconstruction as after. Americans
clung firmly to a belief in the basic inferiority of the Negro race, a belief
supported by the preponderance of nineteenth-century scientific
evidence." 236 Whatever the explanations for adoption of the Fifteenth
Amendment, abatement of racial prejudice was not one of them.
Throughout the leading object of the Republicans was to prevent the
return to power of the slavocracy, because the combination of Southern
23 7
and Northern Democrats could control Congress and elect a President.
So long as the military occupation controlled the South, the North could
block that return to power. In February, 1868, Senator Tipton stated
that "negro suffrage was not looked to as a remedy.., until Congress
came to the conclusion that we could not execute the guarantees of the
2ZT

on

-

221Text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
21'Text accompanying note 81 supra.
23

'Text accompanying note 167 supra.
at 91.

2 2

1 BERGER

2'Id. at 13.
23'Ely at 436 n.133.
"'BERGER at

240.

"1"A belief in racial equality," said W. R. Brock, "was an abolitionist invention"; "to the
majority of men in the mid-nineteenth century it seemed to be condemned both by experience and by science." Id- at 13 n.39. See also id- at 12.
'3'I& at 15-16. Blaine of Maine stated, "The effect contemplated ... is perfectly well
understood, and on all hands frankly avowed. It is to deprive the lately rebellious States of
the unfair advantage of a large representation in this House ... " Id at 66.
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Constitution without raising up a new class of loyal voters.... ")238 H. E.
Paine of Wisconsin stated, "We saw that there was no safety, absolutely
no safety, to the nation except upon the solid rock of loyal reconstruction;
that to such loyal reconstruction loyal majorities were indispensable;
that we could not have majorities of white votes, and therefore must
either have black votes or not have the majorities. '239 There were similar
utterances by others. 240 "There were two alternatives:," said Senator Patterson:, "you must either give them indefinite military rule, which might
lead to military despotism, or you must create a black voting population.
"241

The Fifteenth Amendment does not attest that there was no racism,
either in 1866-1867 or in 1869-1870; rather it responded to changed
political needs. When a few years later political exigencies dictated, the
Republicans handed the Negroes over to the tender mercies of the South
in exchange for the disputed Hayes-Tilden presidential settlement.
"[T]here seems no doubt," wrote Samuel Eliot Morison, "that a deal was
made by the Republicans with Southern Democratic leaders, by virtue of
which, in return for their acquiescence in Hayes's election, they promised
on his behalf to withdraw the garrison and to wink at non-enforcement of
Amendment XV [sic], guaranteeing civil rights to the freedmen. The
bargain was kept on both sides. ' 242 Finally, Ely's appeal to the Fifteenth
Amendment poses the question: why did not the framers, now that sentiment had changed, enact a suffrage statute pursuant to the "invitation"
allegedly issued by the Fourteenth? Who would know better that they
had left that way open? Their resort instead to the difficult ratification
by three-fourths of the states testifies that they knew of no such invitation. It is a
figment of mid-20th century academic fantasy.
CONCLUSION

Ely's article marks an advance beyond his fellow "non-interpretivists"
who are outraged that one should even question the legitimacy of the
Warren Court's "revolution. 2 43 He recognizes the merits, the deeprooted appeal, of the "interpretivist" position, and that it requires an
"heroic inference" to conclude "that enforcement of an 'unwritten constitution' is an appropriate response in a democratic republic." To

8

23AVINS, supra note

73, at 293.
23'Icat 288.
"'Senator Morton, id at 289; Senator Benton, id at 298.
211d at 327.
2425. E. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
24

733-34 (1965).

'Professor Richard Kay wrote of the reapportionment and desegregation decisions:
"These doctrines have now become almost second nature to a generation of lawyers and
scholars. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the casting of a fundamental doubt on such
basic assumptions should produce shock, dismay, and sometimes anger." Kay, Book
Review, 10 CONN. L. REv. 801 (1978).
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counter the "impossible" tradition of resting decision on principles "very
clearly implicit" in the Constitution, Ely invokes an "invitation" to im-

port extra-constitutional values.
Ely himself dismisses the due process clause from the "invitation"
category. His reliance on the privileges or immunities clause runs afoul of
the fact that it had acquired a recognized and limited meaning by judicial
interpretation which, Senator Trumbull explained, the rights enumerated
in the Civil Rights Bill followed, and which, Justice Field correctly

stated, furnished the "interpretation" given by Congress to the
privileges or immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment. Remains the
equal protection clause, that on Ely's broad construction would render
the central privileges or immunities clause superfluous, an interpretation

that must be rejected. The word "equal" is, to say the least, ambiguous;
how far "equality" stretches is subject to endless debate, precisely the

situation requiring resort to the framers' intention.

44

Ely's objection

that there is no "known intent" is contradicted by the constant associa-

tion of "equality," "equal protection" with the limited objectives of the
Civil Rights Act.
Writing about the Roe abortion decision, Ely stated that "the Court
had simply manufactured a constitutional right out of whole cloth and
used it to superimpose its own view of wise social policy on those of the
legislatures. 245 True, this was under the due process clause; but the "new
substantive equal protection," Herbert Packer pointed out, "has under a

different label permitted today's justices to impose their prejudices in
much the same manner as the Four Horsemen... once did.

' 24 6

Ely's solution represents, if not an "impossible" dream, a wildly improbable one. In the face of repeated rejections of attempts in the 39th
Congress to abolish all distinctions, frankly acknowledged by Senator
247
Fessenden and Thaddeus Stevens to be impossible of accomplishment,
of Bickel's recognition that the framers did not dare to go beyond the

Professor Donald P. Kommers, has written: "The tendency of many reviewers of
Berger's book is to dismiss his theory out of hand, in part because the modern liberal mind
just cannot imagine turning the clock back to the days prior to Brown v. Board of Education and because of the fundamental fairness or simple justice for which Brown stands.
But, as Berger suggests, if the Supreme Court's purpose is to establish justice without
reference to the original intent of the framers, then what remains to circumscribe judicial
power? Berger's critics have given singularly unsatisfactory answers to this question."
Kommers, Role of the Supreme Court REV. OF POL. 409, 413 (July, 1978).
2"See
Sumner, at text accompanying note 77 supra.
24
'Ely, supra note 5, at 937.
2
"BERGER at 191-92. Philip Kurland stated that "The new equal protection, like the old
equal protection, is the old substantive due process .... The difference between the new
equal protection and the old substantive due process is essentially the difference in the
hierarchy of values of the Court." Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 645, 661 (1975). Gerald Gunther said, "The bad legacy of substantive due process and of ends-oriented equal protection involves a block to legislative ends,
an2 imposition
of judicial values as to objectives." Id- at 665.
' 7Fessenden, at text accompanying note 174 supra Stevens, at note 211.
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confines of the Civil Rights Act lest the amendment be jeopardized,2'8 of
249
Schenck's repudiation of a "concealed" purpose to grant suffrage, of

Flack's studied conclusion that the broad powers now claimed would
have been repudiated by the electorate9 0 (as its repeated rejection of suffrage alone demonstrates), of the Framers' recorded and pervasive attachment to State sovereignty,2

1

Ely would assume that all this was

nullified by the talismanic terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, terms
that are readily susceptible of a much simpler, traditional interpretation
and on Ockham's rule is therefore to be preferred.
But for a few scattered utterances such as that of Frankfurter, the
Court, as Thomas Grey has noted, "throughout our history" has resorted
to bad legislative history and strained reading of constitutional language to support results that could be better
justified by explication of contemporary moral and political
ideals not drawn from the constitutional text.... [I]f judges
resort to bad interpretation in preference to honest exposition
of deeply held but unwritten ideals, it must be because they
perceive the 2latter mode of decision making to be of suspect
25

legitimacy.

And as Robert Bork has pungently put it, "The way an institution advertises tells you what it thinks its customer demand,

' 25

for the people are

54
unaware that the Court is engaged in rewriting the Constitution.
Ely would rescue the Justices from this cruel dilemma by his "invitation" theory. He attributes to Framers distrustful of the courts an invitation to reverse their unmistakable intention, for example, to exclude suffrage, an invitation upon which the Court had not acted on behalf of
women, leaving that for the Nineteenth Amendment. He would carve out
an exception from the article V amendment power, exclusively reserved
to the people themselves, for the judiciary, who Hamilton observed "is
next to nothing," a pro tanto repeal by implication which cannot be
assumed but must be proved, and which violates the basic principle of

government by consent of the governed.2

55

And to crown his theorizing,

Ely would confine the "invitation" to which the Framers apparently attached no strings-at least he mentions none-by "principles" which he
"'Note 217 supra.
2'Note 82 supra.
2"Note 86 supra.
:"Note 196 supra
"Grey, supra note 35, at 706.
:"BERGER
at 319.
54
1n the midst of the Court-packing debate, Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote President
Franklin Roosevelt: "People have been taught to believe that when the Supreme Court
speaks it is not they who speak but the Constitution, whereas, of course.., it is they who
speak and not the Constitution. And I verily believe that that is what the country needs
most to understand." BERGER at 354, n.15.
2"1"The people," James IredeU said, "have chosen to be governed under such and such
principles. They have not chosen to be governed or promised to submit upon any other."
Id- at 295-96.

19791

GOVERNMENTBYJUDICIARY

hopes to formulate in order to limit the untethered discretion. Should
that not prove possible the courts, Ely admonishes, should "stay away"
from the open-ended provisions, "whatever the framers may have been
assuming." This at least has the merit of being consistent with his
disregard of the Framer's intention. But is it conceivable that the Court
would abjure a discretion so fervently defended by Academe because Ely
cannot come up with limiting principles? Or if he produces such principles that they will weigh more heavily with the Court than did the
Framers' unmistakable intention to exclude suffrage from the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment?
The long-established purpose of constitutionalism is to curb the
authority of those entrusted with power; without such limits, the
Framers well knew, democracy would lapse into Caesarism.1 6 Power
vested in judges, they knew, is potentially tyrannical25' and, as Hamilton
stated, was likewise limited.2 8 This generation has forgotten that for
many years the Court constituted an insuperable obstacle to ameliatory
socio-economic legislation-child labor, minimum wages and hours laws,
income taxes-acting on what Ely now labels an "invitation" to import
extra-constitutional principles. To be sure, the social goals and tactics of
the earlier Court were anathema to those who would now rationalize the
precisely similar Warren Court tactics because they are enamored of its
results. 259 As Senator Sam Ervin remarked, they would "interpret the
Constitutiona to mean what it would have said if they, instead of the
Founding Fathers, had written it. ' 260 Of the academicians' attempts to
rationalize such interpretations, a cool-eyed British political scientist
wrote,
The quite extraordinary contortions that have gone into proving [that case] make sad reading for those impressed by the
high quality of American legal-historical scholarship.2 61
Addendum

As these lines are about to go to the printer, Ely has newly written that
we are not "free to make the Constitution mean whatever we please. '282
He has convincingly demonstrated that a divorce between a judge's per-

25

1 Cf R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 8-16 (1969).
'"See Hutchinson, C.J., at text accompanying note 95 supra.Lord Camden stated, "The
discretion of a Judge is the law of tyrants .... In the best of times it is often times
caprice-in the worst, it is every vice, folly and passion, to which human nature is liable."
R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 152 (1975) (footnote

omitted).
293-94.
"'See Kurland, at note 246 supra.
260Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 8, col. 4.
2"'Beloff, at note 65 supra.
262Ely, Foreword.On DiscoveringFundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5 (1978).
"'1BERGER at
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sonal values and the social consensus that activists would have him
divine is delusory, that what he is "really... discovering... are his own
values,

'263

that judges are by no means "best equipped to make moral

judgments, in particular that they are [not] better suited to the task than
legislators." '2

64

And he comments that "our society did not make the con-

stitutional decision to move to near-universal suffrage [i.e. a democratic
society] and have superimposed on popular decision the values of firstrate lawyers, ' 2 6 5 that is, judges. With this I am in full accord, but in that

case what becomes of the "invitation" to "import ... considerations that
will not be found... in the Constitution"? A fellow-activist, Michael
Perry, who apparently goes too far for Ely, 2 6 has just written of Ely's

major premise, the "open-ended theory," that Berger has "devastated
the notion that the framers of the fourteenth amendment... intended it
7
to be open-ended.

'2 6

In contrast to Ely's yet-to-be formulated "principles" that should
"limit" untethered judicial discretion, I do not suggest a general,
"unified field theory," but make a modest proposal: given that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly and unmistakably
intended to exclude suffrage and segregation from the scope of the
amendment-the proof for which at least half-a-dozen commentators, including activists, now accept as solid 26 -judges are not empowered to
decide suffrage and segregation issues. That is a clearly discernible
"limit," one which the sovereign people themselves imposed, and which
under the democratic principles Ely so eloquently sets forth,269 should

command our adherence.

63

Id at 16; see also, id. at 49,51. Ely notes that "Lenin used to claim this godlike gift of
divination of the people's 'real interests'...." Id. at 51, n.198. The judge, said Learned
Hand, "has no right to divination of public opinion which runs counter to its last formal expression."
L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 14 (1952).
26 4
Ely, supra note 262, at 35.
2
111d. at 38.
26
11d. at 48 n.185.
26
Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 695, 691 (1978). Ely himself is now critical
of the proposition that "the Court should give content to the Constitution's open-ended

provisions by identifying and enforcing upon the political branches America's fundamental values." Ely, supra note 262, at 15-16. An innocent bystander might wonder why Ely
was
moved to blast my analysis when it so closely parallels his own.
268
Ely, supra note 255, at 403-11; supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
26
Activists: Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another
Look at the "OriginalIntent" Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST.
L. 603,606-07 (1978); Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REV. 579,580-81 (1978); Perry,
supra note 260, at 687-91; others: Kommers, Role of the Supreme Court,REV. OF PofL 409,
413 (July, 1978); Beloff, Book Review, THE TIMES (London) Higher Education Supp.II,
April, 1978.
In a forthcoming article, Louis Lusky, a long-time activist, refers to "Justice Harlan's irrefutable and unrefuted demonstration (in dissent) that the Fourteenth Amendment was
not intended to protect the right to vote ..
" Lusky, Government by Judiciary: What
Price Legitimacy, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.(1979).

